This paper analyses the effects of redistribution in a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms in which a fair-wage effort mechanism leads to firm-specific wage payments and involuntary unemployment. The redistribution scheme is financed by profit taxes and gives the same absolute lump-sum transfer to all workers. In this setting a higher tax rate reduces aggregate labour income and makes the income distribution more equal, with unemployment remaining unaffected. International trade increases aggregate income, income inequality and the unemployment rate, ceteris paribus. If, however, trade is accompanied by a suitably chosen increase in the profit tax rate, it is possible to achieve higher aggregate income and a more equal income distribution than in autarky, provided that the share of exporters is sufficiently high. JEL-Classification: D31, F12, F15, F16, H25
Introduction
The recent theoretical literature on trade with heterogeneous firms and labour market imperfections has highlighted a source of worker specific effects of globalisation that was previously ignored: Imperfect labour markets create not only involuntary unemployment, but also firmspecific wage rates, and hence the effect that globalisation has on two ex ante identical workers can be very different depending on whether they are employed by a successful or an unsuccessful firm. This literature points to a new facet concerning the distributional effects of globalisation:
an increase in intra-group income inequality, as measured by the dispersion of wages between workers who do not differ in their individual characteristics. There is no doubt that in many countries intra-group inequality is an important part of overall inequality, and that it has increased substantially during the recent wave of globalisation (Barth and Lucifora, 2006; Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008) .
The worker-specific effects of globalisation feature prominently in the model of Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) , which combines the Melitz (2003) framework with a fair-wage effort model of the Akerlof and Yellen (1990) type. In this setting workers exert full effort only if the wage payment is at least as high as the wage they consider to be fair. With the fair wage of workers being linked to the economic success of the firm they are working in, the implications of this model are well in line with the empirical evidence that larger, more productive firms pay higher wages (see Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999; Faggio, Salvanes and Van Reenen, 2007) .
Furthermore, since these are the firms that export in the open economy, the model also offers an explanation for the stylised fact that exporters pay higher wages than non-exporters (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Schank, Schnabel and Wagner, 2007) .
In the present paper, we extend the model of Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) by introducing a government sector that redistributes income in the economy towards low income workers.
Analysing a framework that incorporates a redistributive government is interesting, since it has been widely argued that increasing inequality is a major cause for the protectionist drift in public policy. Scheve and Slaughter (2007, p. 44) argue that "a significant income redistribution that serves to share globalisation's gains more widely" is vital for sustaining current levels of international integration. And in a similar vein, a study by the OECD (2008) states that "[f]ears of rising income inequalities (. . .) loom large in current discussions of how globalisation is affecting OECD economies and societies. Such fears are probably the single most important concern put forward by those who argue that we should resist the increased integration of our economies and societies" (p. 3). 1
In this paper, we consider a simple redistribution scheme, in which the government taxes profits and uses the proceeds to pay the same absolute per capita transfer to all individuals. The key features of this stylised tax-transfer system seem plausible: It renders the distribution of disposable labour income indeed more equal according to the Lorenz criterion, and redistributes income from the group of workers who have a job to those who are unemployed, similar to a wage-tax based unemployment compensation scheme. On the other hand it lowers aggregate labour income. The decrease in aggregate income comes about despite the fact that the pure profit tax distorts neither the incentives nor the competitive position of firms that are already in the market. The tax does, however, make firm entry into the market less attractive, which in a Melitz-type framework implies that firms with lower productivities survive and as a consequence the average productivity of active firms decreases. 2
1 The insight that redistributing the gains from trade can reduce opposition against globalisation is not new. Lawrence and Litan (1986) proposed a pragmatic approach that complements trade liberalisation by policy measures that lead to a more equal distribution of the gains from trade among U.S. workers.
2 The redistribution scheme considered in this paper ignores labour income taxation as a separate source of Analysing the effect of international trade in our model, we look at two scenarios. First, we consider a situation where the profit tax rate is held constant, and find that there are gains from trade for the economy as a whole, but unemployment increases and the distribution of disposable income becomes more unequal. Notably though, the only individuals who are worse off in absolute terms are those workers who lose their job. Second, we explore the possibility of an increase in the tax rate when the economy starts to trade. The idea is to find out whether a tax reform exists that makes the income distribution more equal in the open economy than it was under autarky, without eliminating the gains from trade completely. It is shown that for a sufficiently high share of exporting firms it is indeed possible to make distribution more equal and increase aggregate income. This however is not always the case with a low proportion of exporters.
There are other papers besides Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) that feature worker-specific effects of globalisation. While all of the existing studies consider productivity differences as the main source for firm heterogeneity, and most of them build on the Melitz (2003) framework (with Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko, 2008 , being a notable exception), two strands of this literature can be distinguished with respect to the modelling of the labour market imperfection. Helpman and Itskhoki (2007 ), Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008 ), and Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008 consider a search and matching model with wage bargaining at the individual or the collective level. On the other hand, there are several papers that consider efficiency wages as the main source of labour market imperfection. Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model assumptions, characterises the autarky equilibrium and provides insights into the role of redistribution for aggregate income, employment and the income distribution. Section 3 shows how trade between two symmetric countries affects the main variables of interest when the profit tax rate is held constant. In section 4, we shed light on the scope for policy reforms in the open economy that lower income inequality as compared to autarky, without eliminating the gains from trade completely. In section 5, we drop our assumption of complete symmetry between the countries and analyse how country specific tax rates would affect our results. Section 6 summarises the most important results.
3 There is also, of course, a large literature that looks at the issue of compensating the losers from trade. Only few contributions to this literature consider labour market imperfections. The model of Brecher and Choudhri (1994) features involuntary unemployment due to a binding minimum wage. In a more recent contribution, Davidson and Matusz (2006) study redistribution policies in a dynamic model with search frictions in which workers are displaced by trade shocks. They look at a variety of possible policy interventions to compensate losers from trade and rank them in terms of their efficiency. Itskhoki (2008) has a different focus, as he investigates
optimal redistribution in open economies and formulates a specific welfare function with income inequality entering negatively in the objective of the government (see Lommerud, Sandvik and Straume, 2004 , for a similar approach).
As a consequence, optimal redistribution of the gains from trade may lead to higher income inequality and, in principle, also to income losses of certain individuals.
We start in section 2.1 by describing key elements of the heterogeneous firm model with firmspecific wage rates developed in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) . The analysis of firm entry is added in section 2.2, where we also extend the basic model by introducing a simple tax-transfer system that aims at redistributing income towards workers with lower income, and analyse the effect that this system has on aggregate variables. Section 2.3 looks at the effect that the tax-transfer system has on the distribution of labour income.
A Model of Firm-Specific Wages in General Equilibrium
We consider an economy with a single factor of production, labour L, that is used in the production of differentiated intermediate goods which are sold under monopolistic competition.
There is a second sector, which produces homogeneous final output Y under perfect competition, using the differentiated intermediates as the only inputs. The production function for final output is given by
with the measure of set V representing the mass of available intermediate goods M . 4 We take final output as the numeraire, and hence the CES price index P corresponding to the production function in eq. (1) an isoelastic demand function for each variety of the intermediate good:
where σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) equals the constant elasticity of substitution between the different varieties.
Intermediate goods producers maximise their profits by charging prices as a constant markup 1/ρ over their respective marginal cost, w i /(φ i ε i ), where φ i denotes the productivity level of firm i, w i is the wage paid by firm i and ε i is the effort exerted by workers employed in firm i. Wage and effort at the firm level are linked by a fair-wage effort mechanism along the lines of Akerlof and Yellen (1990) :
, whereŵ i is the wage considered to be fair by workers in firm i. 5 It is easily checked that a firm cannot reduce its marginal cost by paying less than the fair wage, as the effort in this case falls proportionally. Hence we can safely assume, following Akerlof and Yellen (1990) , that firms pay at least the fair wage, and consequently ε i = 1 ∀i.
Furthermore, it is shown below that firms can hire the profit maximising number of workers if they set w i =ŵ i , so this is what they do in equilibrium.
The wage considered to be fair by a worker depends on two factors: first, the economic success of the firm in which the worker is employed and, second, the income opportunities outside the present job, represented by per capita wage income. As in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), we use the productivity level of a firm as a measure for its economic success and assumê
wherew is the average wage rate of those who have a job and (1 − U ) is the employment rate.
The specification in eq. (3) concurs with the idea of Akerlof and Yellen (1990) that the fair wage should contain both a firm-internal and a firm-external component. However, in contrast 5 Howitt (2002) and Bewley (2005) provide a discussion of the empirical evidence that supports the importance of fairness considerations for real world wage payments.
to Akerlof and Yellen we do not associate the internal component with wage payments to a different skill group but rather link it to the profitability of the firm. This approach is well embedded in the (mainly experimental) literature on fairness and reciprocity. 6
Due to markup pricing, aggregate wage income is a fraction ρ of aggregate revenues R. The wage at the firm level is therefore determined by
and the relative wage paid by two different firms is only a function of their relative productivities: w i /w j = (φ i /φ j ) θ . 7 Similar ratios can be derived for relative prices, outputs, revenues (denoted by r), and employment levels (denoted by l), where we find
These expressions collapse to the respective expressions in the model of Melitz (2003) if we set θ = 0.
Each intermediate goods producer has to operate its own distribution system and thus has to bear a fixed beachhead cost f , in units of final output. With these fixed costs being identical for all producers and firms differing in their productivity levels, we can formulate a zero profit 6 Summarizing the main insights from this literature, Fehr and Gächter (2000, p. 172) point out that the idea of gift exchange, which underlies the fair wage-effort hypothesis, implies that "more profitable firms pay higher wages." Similarly, Danthine and Kurmann (2007) conclude from an extensive literature review that an appropriate specification of the reference wage should capture the fact that "the better (worse) the firm is doing, the more (less) the worker expects to be paid in exchange for a given level of effort" (p. 858). 7 Our model is thus consistent with the empirical observation that more productive firms pay higher wages.
Workers would clearly prefer to work for a more productive firm. However, in a situation where effort is -as assumed -non-contractible, firms have no incentive to accept underbidding of their current wage by outside workers. The reason is that immediately after being hired workers would adjust their reference wage according to eq. (3) and thus reduce their effort if the wage falls short ofŵ(φ). Fehr and Falk (1999) confirm in laboratory experiments that the lack of a binding contract on effort plays a crucial role in rendering underbidding by outside workers unsuccessful.
condition π(φ * ) = r(φ * )/σ − f = 0, which separates those firms that produce, i.e. the firms with productivities φ ≥ φ * , from those firms that remain inactive, i.e. the firms with productivities φ < φ * . The explicit determination of cutoff productivity level φ * is deferred to section 2.2, where we discuss firm entry.
As in the Melitz model, it is possible -and very useful -to define an "average" firm with productivityφ. Average productivityφ is implicitly determined by q(φ) = Y /M , implying that the output of the average firm equals the output per firm in the economy. Substitution in the demand function shows that this definition implies p(φ) = 1, and hence aggregate revenues and aggregate profits are equal to R = Y = M r(φ) and Π = M π(φ), respectively. Following the steps in Melitz (2003) we can now write the average productivity as
where G(φ) denotes the productivity distribution, and g(φ) the respective density function.
In order to get explicit solutions, we follow the by now common approach and choose the Pareto distribution -with the lower bound of productivities normalised to one -to parametrise G(φ): G(φ) = 1−φ −k and g(φ) = kφ −(k+1) . 8 In this case, average productivityφ is proportional to cutoff productivity φ * :φ
Accounting for π(φ * ) = 0, it is then immediate that
and hence the profit of the average firm, which is equal to average profits in the economȳ π ≡ Π/M , is independent ofφ. That is, independent of the actual productivity of the average firm its profits are fixed by model parameters.
With the average firm being characterised by productivity levelφ, we can now also look at the aggregate labour market outcomes. Total wage income can be determined by combining eq.
(4) for the average firm with the markup pricing condition w(φ) =φρ. Accounting for eq. (6), this gives
with
which in analogy to Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) can be reformulated to obtain an explicit solution for the employment rate:
We assume ∆ < 1, which is sufficient to ensure that unemployment is strictly positive for all θ > 0. 9 An important feature of the model is jointly illustrated by eqs. (8) and (9): Aggregate output and hence income are an increasing function of the cutoff productivity φ * . As this functional relationship is proportional, aggregate employment in the closed economy is independent of φ * : Any increase in the cutoff productivity -and thus, according to eq. (6), any increase inφ -translates one-for-one into an increase in total output, leaving no room for aggregate employment effects.
9 This condition is also sufficient for w(φ * ) > ρR/L, which implies that even those who are employed in the least productive firm have a higher labour income than the one expected outside their current job.
A Simple Model of Redistribution
We now enrich our basic model structure in section 2.1 and introduce a simple tax-transfer system that aims at reducing labour income inequality, which arises due to firm-specific wage payments and the existence of involuntary unemployment. The redistribution system is financed by a tax on profits π(φ), which is imposed by the government at a rate of s ∈ (0, 1), and tax revenues are redistributed to workers in a lump sum fashion, with identical transfer payments to all individuals. This redistribution scheme has two notable features: First, the profit tax does not influence the pricing behaviour of firms, so that π(φ) remains unaffected by adjustments in tax rate s. Second, due to the lump-sum nature of the transfer, the fair wage constraint (4) is unaffected by changes in the redistribution scheme as well.
Taking into account the government budget constraint, the transfer income for each worker equals sMπ/L. Hence, secondary, i.e. post-transfer, labour income, which is the sum of primary (pre-transfer ) wage income and transfer payments, is given by I/L = (ρR + sMπ)/L. It is clear from our analysis above that there is a link between aggregate gross profits Mπ and aggregate revenues R. In particular, we have Mπ = Rρ(1−θ)/k. 10 Using eq. (8), secondary labour income can then be written as
From eq. (10), it is immediate that for a given cutoff productivity φ * , per capita labour income unambiguously increases in the profit tax parameter s.
The analysis is obviously incomplete, however, without endogenising φ * . To this end, we follow Melitz (2003) and assume that there is an unbounded pool of potential entrants into the
be reformulated to Mπ = Rξ/(σk). Using ξ ≡ (σ − 1)(1 − θ) and ρ ≡ (σ − 1)/σ, we obtain the equation in the text.
intermediates sector. Each firm that decides to enter has to pay a fixed cost f e (thereafter sunk), measured in units of the final good. After this investment, firms can participate in a lottery and draw their productivity from the Pareto distribution G(φ). There is an infinite number of time periods. In each of these periods, firms with productivity φ ≥ φ * start production because they make non-negative gross profits π(φ) ≥ 0. Firms face a probability of death δ in each period, and hence -assuming that there is no discounting and focusing on a steady state equilibrium -the present value of gross profits for a firm with φ ≥ φ * is π(φ)/δ. With profit taxation, the free entry condition for the intermediates sector requires that in equilibrium the sunk costs f e of entering the productivity draw must equal the present value of average net profits of active firms (1 − s)π/δ, multiplied by the probability of a successful draw, 1 − G(φ * ). Formally, using our assumption of Pareto distributed productivities, we get
Together, the zero cutoff profit condition in eq. (7) and the free entry condition in eq. (11) determine the cutoff productivity level:
In order to allow for the existence of an equilibrium with positive profit tax rates, we need β > 1, which is the case if f is sufficiently high and/or δ, f e are sufficiently small. It is easily checked in eq. (12) that tax rates s ≥ (β − 1)/β would lead to φ * ≤ 1, and they are therefore excluded from consideration.
Eq. (12) shows that an increase in the profit tax rate lowers the cutoff productivity φ * . A higher profit tax rate reduces expected net profits, and hence entry into the productivity lottery becomes less attractive. This lowers the mass of entrants, ceteris paribus, and demand for each variety increases (see eq. (2)). As a consequence, revenues of all active firms increase and less productive firms than before the tax increase can survive. This leads to a decline in primary labour income, which reflects the efficiency loss from profit taxation. More specifically, both primary labour income and the mass of intermediate input producers decrease proportionally to the cutoff productivity level. This follows from eq. (8) and M = R/r(φ). 11
Putting together, there are two counteracting effects of a higher profit tax rate on secondary labour income. On the one hand, I/L increases for a given primary income level, while, on the other hand, primary labour income declines. To determine which of these two effects dominates, we can first look at the impact of an increase in s on the level of per capita transfer payments, which can be written as
The per capita transfer payment η(s) reaches a unique maximum atŝ = k/(k + 1). Since tax rates s >ŝ would reduce both primary labour income as well as transfer payments, only (Laffer-efficient) tax rates s <ŝ need to be considered in the subsequent analysis. 12
Substituting eq. (12) into eq. (10), we can rewrite aggregate labour income as
11 In our setup, profit taxes exhibit an impact on the cutoff productivity level only if (i) the outcome of the productivity draw is uncertain prior to market entry and (ii) the costs of participating in the lottery are sunk after the draw. Both of these assumptions are well founded in the industrial economics literature, and the interplay of sunk costs and uncertainty is widely accepted as a crucial determinant of the investment decision of firms (see Pindyck, 1991 , for an overview). Without these two assumptions, e.g. in a setting with an exogenous pool of entrants and predetermined productivities as in Do and Levchenko (2009) , a profit tax would be a lump-sum instrument and hence would not lower efficiency. 12 Notably s =ŝ induces φ * < 1 if β > k + 1. In this case, the transfer payment is strictly increasing in s over the admissible s-interval (0, (β − 1)/β).
It is easily checked that A(0) = 1 and A (s) < 0. Hence, with a positive profit tax aggregate income unambiguously falls below its benchmark level in the situation without redistribution, which is β 1/k ∆. This captures the efficiency loss from profit taxation.
Finally, it is straightforward to see that the tax-transfer system considered does not affect the employment rate: We have shown that the profit tax affects firm entry, thereby lowering cutoff productivity, average productivity and aggregate output proportionally. As argued in section 2.1, this proportionality prevents employment effects of changes in φ * . Aggregate employment continues to be determined by eq. (9). The main insights from this section are summarised as follows:
Proposition 1. A profit-tax based redistribution system with lump-sum transfers that are the same in absolute terms for all individuals, lowers primary as well as secondary labour income and leaves the employment rate unaffected.
Distributional Effects
Having determined the effect of the tax-transfer system on aggregate variables, we now turn to the analysis of its impact on the income distribution. It is convenient to proceed in two steps: First we analyse the effect of the tax-transfer system on the wage distribution across acitve firms (the wage profile). We then look at the effect the system has on the employment allocation across firms. Put together, the two pieces of information allow us to infer the effect on the wage -and eventually income -distribution across individuals.
The analysis simplifies drastically if we look at the wage profile not in terms of firms' produci-tivities φ but in terms of their inverse marginal costs κ, where κ ≡ φ/w(φ). The simplification results from the fact that κ * , the inverse marginal cost of the marginal firm is unaffected by s, since from eqs. (4) and (8) we have κ * = ∆ θ−1 . Using eqs. (8), (12) and the definition of κ, we can rewrite the wage equation (4) to obtain
With κ * constant, it follows from (16) that w(κ * ), the wage paid by the marginal firm, falls as s
, we see that the relative wage of any two firms identified by their respective inverse marginal cost (κ-firms for short) is constant. 13
The total income of a worker employed in a firm with inverse marginal cost κ is given by
and we find ∂B/∂s < 0, ∀κ ≥ κ * = ∆ θ−1 . This shows that an individual employed by a firm with the same marginal cost before and and after the increase in s loses in absolute terms from the redistribution scheme. The results are illustrated in figure 1.
In order to link the income distribution across firms just derived to the income distribution across individuals, we need to find the effect that an increase in s has on the labour allocation across firms. Using the link between relative productivities and relative employment levels derived above as well as the definition of κ, we find l i /l j = (κ i /κ j ) (ξ−θ)/(1−θ) , and hence relative employment levels of any two κ-firms stay constant. Thus, the employment shares across κ-firms for the interpersonal income distribution of employed workers as well: Assuming that the ranking of workers according to their wage stays constant, all employed workers lose in absolute terms from the tax-transfer system. The only winners in absolute terms are the unemployed, as they receive only transfer income. Hence, the redistribution system shifts income from those who are employed to those who are unemployed -similar to a wage-tax based unemployment compensation scheme.
We now finally look at the overall income distribution in the economy, using the standard analytical tool of the Lorenz curve. Due to the labour composition and the wage profile effect, it is immediate that the Lorenz curve for primary labour income is invariant to changes in the tax parameter s and is therefore represented by the same locus L notransfer in figure 2, irrespective of whether there is redistribution or not. In the interval [0, U ] this curve is flat because primary income of unemployed individuals is zero. 14 As the redistribution system leaves the primary income distribution unchanged, and the same absolute transfer is given to every individual, it 14 Since the formal derivation of the Lorenz curves is tedious, we defer the details to a supplement, which is available from the authors upon request. There, we also provide a proof for the respective invariance result. 
The Effects of International Trade
We now consider international trade between two countries that are symmetric in all respects, including their system of redistribution. 
Preliminaries
In the open economy, there is frictionless trade of the final good, while international transactions of intermediates are subject to two types of transport costs. On the one hand, there are fixed per period beachhead costs f x , measured in units of final output, to enter the foreign market and to operate a local distribution system there. For simplicity we focus on the case where domestic fixed costs and export fixed costs are identical, f = f x . On the other hand, there are iceberg transport costs, implying that τ > 1 units of the intermediates must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive in the foreign economy. Due to these iceberg transport costs, an exporting firm sets higher prices in the foreign economy (denoted by subscript x) than in its home market, resulting in lower demand and lower revenues:
where the respective domestic variables are determined as described above. Domestic profits and export profits are given by π(φ) = r(φ)/σ − f and π x (φ) = r x (φ)/σ − f x , respectively, and
It is now easy to see that our transport cost assumptions lead to self-selection of the most productive firms into export status. The domestic cutoff productivity is determined by r(φ * ) = σf , while the export cutoff productivity is determined by r x (φ * x ) = σf x . With f = f x this implies r(φ * ) = r x (φ * x ) = τ 1−σ r(φ * x ), and therefore r(φ * x )/r(φ * ) = τ σ−1 > 1. Hence, with τ > 1 the marginal exporting firm makes strictly higher profits in its domestic market than the marginal firm in the market, and it therefore must be a firm with higher productivity. Using the relationships derived above we find specifically φ * x /φ * = τ 1/(1−θ) .
The proportion of firms that export χ equals the ex ante probability that a successful produc-tivity draw with φ ≥ φ * will exceed the export cutoff φ * x as well:
The proportion of exporters is therefore χ = τ −k/(1−θ) , and notably it only depends on the level of iceberg transport costs, but not on the extent of redistribution as measured by the profit tax rate s. Clearly, with τ > 1 we have χ ∈ (0, 1) implying that only a subset of the firms actually exports in equilibrium. Only in the borderline case of zero variable transport costs,
i.e. τ = 1, even the least productive firms would find it attractive to start exporting, implying χ = 1. The mass of varieties available to domestic consumers is M t = M (1 + χ), where M is the mass of domestic firms -and thus the mass of domestically produced varieties.
As in the closed economy, the analysis is greatly simplified by defining the average productivity of all firms in the market -this time including the importing firms. The average productivitỹ φ t is implicitly defined by q(φ t ) = Y /M t : the quantity produced by the average firm for its home market is equal to the average quantity produced by all firms selling in this market. In the case considered here with f x = f , it is readily shown thatφ t equalsφ, the average productivity of domestic firms in the open economy. 16 The analysis of the trade effects on the domestic economy is simplified enormously by this result: From eq. (6) we know thatφ/φ * is a constant, and with the additional knowledge ofφ =φ t the effect of trade on the average productivityφ t can be directly inferred from its effect on the cutoff productivity. Furthermore, applying r(φ * ) = σf and noting eq. (7), it is immediate that domestic revenues and profits of the average firm -with r(φ) = r(φ t ) and π(φ) = π(φ t ) due toφ =φ t -remain at their autarky levels.
16 As discussed in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) , this is the result of two effects that influence the relative size ofφ andφt in opposite directions. On the one hand, exporting firms are more productive than non-exporting ones, and this export selection effect increasesφt/φ, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, goods melt away en route due to variable (iceberg) transport costs, and this lost in transit effect reduces the measured productivity of exporters in the destination country, thereby reducingφt/φ, ceteris paribus. With fx = f both effects exactly offset each other, so thatφt =φ.
Income and Employment
The cutoff productivity in the open economy still has to be compatible with the free entry condition (11), according to which the expected net profits from entering the market have to equal the fixed entry cost f e . Expected profits of market entry have to be adjusted, however, for overseas profits of exporters. It follows from the definition ofφ t and the assumption that the two trading economies are perfectly symmetric that aggregate pre-tax profits in the economy Π equal M t π(φ t ). Average pre-tax profitsπ t of domestic firms are therefore equal to Π/M = (1+χ)π(φ t ), where π(φ t ) is determined in eq. (7). Substitution into free entry condition (11) yields the cutoff productivity for the open economy:
Per capita income I/L is increasing in the cutoff productivity -see eq. (10). With profit taxes remaining constant when a country starts trading, we get
where subscript a denotes the respective value of a variable under autarky. Hence, there are gains from trade, and their size is unaffected by the extent to which income is redistributed within the two countries.
Aggregate employment in the open economy obeys the adding up condition
where l x (φ) = τ 1−σ l(φ) is the employment of a firm with productivity φ for its export production.
We can explicitly solve for the employment rate in direct analogy to eq. (9) to get
International trade therefore decreases aggregate employment as long as there is partitioning of firms by their export status, i.e. as long as χ < 1. With χ = 1, employment in the open economy would equal employment under autarky. These results are again independent of the extent of redistribution. Having shown that the employment rate in the closed economy is independent of s, the same must hence be true for the employment rate in the open economy.
The main results from this subsection are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. With two symmetric countries and partitioning of firms by their export status, international trade raises aggregate labour income and unemployment.
Distribution
In this section we take a closer look at the distributional effects of trade. In doing so, we focus on the case of a constant profit tax rate, and hence look at a situation where the volume of redistribution remains a constant share of aggregate (per period) profits.
Let us start by looking at distribution effects among employed workers. To this end, it is helpful to employ a strategy that we used earlier, and look at the distribution of firms not in terms of their productivity but in terms of their inverse marginal cost. Eqs. (4) and (8) continue to hold in the open economy, and therefore we still have κ * = ∆ θ−1 , and hence the wage paid by the marginal firm, w(κ * ), increases proportionally with the cutoff productivity level. Furthermore, the demand function for domestic output in the open economy can be written as q(φ) = r(φ t )p(φ) −σ and with r(φ t ) being constant and firms practicing mark-up pricing, it follows immediately that output q(φ * ) = q(κ * ) of the marginal firm is constant as well. Employment q(κ * )/φ * of the marginal firm falls, as it is inversely proportional to φ * .
Relative wages across firms are unaffected by international trade, and the same is true for relative employment levels of firms for their respective domestic production. With exporting 17 For firms with inverse marginal cost higher than the exporting cutoff level κ * x total employment is equal to l(κ)+lx(κ) = (1+τ 1−σ )l(κ). Total employment in an exporting firm is higher than the employment in a firm under autarky that has the same marginal cost. The relative employment level is given by (1+τ While it is unambiguous according to the Lorenz criterion that inequality is larger in the open than in the closed economy, it is worth noting that trade brings a gain in absolute terms for those who were unemployed in the autarky equilibrium (due to higher transfers) and to those who had a job in the autarky equilibrium and stay employed (due to increasing wages and 18 If there were no variable transport costs (τ = 1), all firms would export, implying that inequality among those who have a job would be unaffected by a movement from autarky to trade. Furthermore, the unemployment rate would be unaffected as well, so that the Lorenz curves of the closed and the open economy would be congruent in this borderline case. This brings to the forefront that it is the selection of the best firms into export status which is responsible for the adverse distributional implications of trade liberalisation. A formal proof of the relative position of the two Lorenz curves is available from the authors upon request. 
Adjustments in the Redistribution System
We have seen that the proposed redistribution system cannot eliminate the principal conflict between positive income and negative distribution effects of trade, when profit tax rates are held constant. On the other hand, we know that an increase in the profit tax rate, while reducing aggregate income, makes the secondary income distribution more equal. In this section we check whether it is possible to devise a reform of the profit tax rate that renders income distribution more equal than under autarky, without eliminating the gains from trade completely.
The scope for such a policy reform is illustrated in figure 5 . The top panel of the figure shows cutoff productivity and aggregate income in the open economy relative to their respective autarky levels as a function of χ. The highest of the three curves represents relative cutoff productivities and relative income levels for the case where the profit tax rate is the same under autarky and trade. The remaining two curves correspond to a trade-cum-redistribution (TCR) reform, where the movement from autarky to trade is accompanied by an increase in s. The second curve from top represents relative incomes, while the third (dotted) curve represents relative cutoff productivities, illustrating that the increase in s reduces both cutoff productivity and aggregate income, ceteris paribus, but income falls by less. This is because, as we have shown above, the increase in s leads to an increase in the share of aggregate income that accrues to labour. Given the particular increase in s for which the figure is drawn, we can see that there are still gains from trade, provided that χ is larger thanχ 1 . Notably, forχ 2 > χ >χ 1 the TCR package increases aggregate income despite reducing the cutoff productivity. for χ ∈ (0, 1). The increase in s reduces inequality, and hence the curve for the TCR reform lies strictly below the original curve. Clearly, all TCR reforms for which both χ >χ 1 and 19 Formal details on the derivation of the two Gini coefficients are deferred to a supplement, which is available upon request. There, we also discuss the properties of the G/Ga locus.
χ >χ 3 hold increase aggregate income and make the secondary income distribution more equal, as measured by the Gini coefficient. 20 For χ =χ 3 >χ 1 the Lorenz curves for autarky and the TCR reform intersect, because the unemployed get higher transfers, but the Gini coefficients in both situations are the same. We can be sure that a more equal distribution of labour incomes under the TCR reform according to the Lorenz criterion is assured for χ >χ 4 , wherē χ 4 ∈ (χ 3 , 1), since with χ = 1 the Lorenz curve for primary labour income remains unchanged.
The analysis in this section implies the following key result:
Proposition 5. It is always possible to find a TCR reform that leads to gains from trade as well as a more equal income distribution, provided the share of exporting firms is sufficiently high.
Country-Specific Tax Rates
In this section we account for asymmetries of countries in their redistribution schemes, i.e. we consider differences of countries in the tax parameter s. 21 With asymmetric countries, notation needs to be adjusted and we use subscripts H and F to refer to countries Home and Foreign.
Due to frictionless trade of final goods the CES price index is the same in both countries, and using our previous normalisation we have P H = P F = 1. In deriving the results for the case of symmetric countries we made extensive use of the fact that under complete symmetry the average productivity of domestic firms in the open economy,φ, is equal to the average productivity of 20 It is clear from inspection of figure 5 that the higher the s increase of a TCR reform, the lower the range of values for χ that still lead to gains from trade, and the higher the range of values for χ that are compatible with decreasing inequality according to the Gini criterion. 21 Of course, there may be other aspects as well in which countries differ. One natural candidate for country asymmetries is population size, i.e. the number of workers. However, excluding external scale effects by considering production technology (1), the unemployment rate in our model does not exhibit a size pattern and hence, similar to Melitz (2003) , pure country size differences would not affect our results.
all firms selling to the domestic market,φ t . So what happens when in an otherwise similar situation H and F set different profit tax rates? We have the following important result:
Lemma 1. In a trade equilibrium with country-specific profit tax rates, the equality ofφ andφ t within each country continues to hold.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Consider for concreteness an increase in s F , while keeping s H constant. In analogy to our earlier results κ * F is independent of s F , because wage and productivity of the marginal firm fall proportionally when s F increases. With relative wages and employment shares across κ firms unaffected, the prices -and therefore the competitive position -of foreign firms remain unchanged. The only channel through which the increase in s F influences the home country is through the effect on the mass of foreign firms: M F falls proportionally with φ * F , and with the share of exporters constant at χ = τ −k/(1−θ) , the proportion of domestically produced varieties in the mass of domestically consumed varieties increases:
The increase in M H /M tH leavesφ t /φ in each country unchanged, however, with the lost-intransit effect and the export-selection effect exactly offsetting each other (see fn. 16). Lemma 1 is a powerful result. It implies that as long as we consider domestic and foreign beachhead costs to be the same, the insights from section 3 remain unaffected when we extend our model to one with asymmetric tax rates.
This paper investigates the effects of a profit-tax based redistribution scheme in a trade model with heterogeneous firms and imperfect labour markets. In the model there are aggregate gains from international trade, but the personal income distribution becomes more unequal, partly driven by an increase in the number of unemployed, partly by an expansion of high-wage exporting firms. The redistribution scheme considered, while simple, is well-equipped in principle to mitigate the detrimental distribution effects of international trade, since by increasing the profit tax one could increase the transfer payments, thereby making the secondary income distribution more equal, ceteris paribus. Since any increase in the profit tax entails a welfare cost, reflected in a reduction of aggregate income, the crucial issue is whether trade-cum-redistribution (TCR) reforms can be found within our system that make the income distribution more equal without destroying the gains from trade completely. We show that these reforms can be found if a sufficiently large share of firms export, while it may be impossible to reconcile gains from trade with a more equal income distribution if the share of exporters is small.
To facilitate the analysis, we have considered identical domestic and foreign beachhead costs, i.e. f = f x , throughout our analysis. We have shown in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) that this assumption simplifies the analysis dramatically, but that the effects of globalisation on the distribution of labour income do not critically depend on it. Gains from trade however are only guaranteed with f x ≥ f , and hence we would expect our main results to extend to this case.
An exception is the analysis of country-specific tax rates in section 5, for which the equality of domestic and foreign beachhead costs is essential.
Allowing countries to change their profit tax rates unilaterally is a first step towards a more comprehensive analysis of policy setting in an open economy with heterogeneous firms. Our work provides insights into this issue and shows that under our fixed cost assumptions there is no strategic motive for tax authorities in the open economy. However, this result changes if foreign beachhead costs differ from domestic ones. In this case, profit taxes would influence firm entry in the foreign economy with feedback effects on the home country. These feedback effects would provide an incentive for the strategic choice of tax policy, an issue that does not arise in our setting. A further open research question is the optimal timing of redistribution policies. The analysis in this paper has focused on steady-state equilibria, and hence the results do not provide insights on whether and to what extent the timing of the intervention matters for inequality during the transition from autarky to trade. While extending the formal analysis in both these directions would be interesting, it is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
Using the usual definition of the CES price index, and recalling P H = 1, we can write 
and p H (φ tH ) = p F (φ tF ) = 1, this yields
and solving forφ tH gives
Due to the fair wage constraint, the relative wage of any two firms with the same productivity φ that are based in different countries is determined by these countries' average productivities: w H (φ)/w F (φ) = (φ tH /φ tF ) 1−θ . With identical productivities and markup pricing,
It was shown earlier that relative prices of two firms i and j are related to their relative domestic revenues by r i /r j = (p i /p j ) 1−σ . Combining these results
gives r H (φ)/r F (φ) = (φ tH /φ tF ) −ξ . Rewriting this relationship for two firms with productivity φ * xF and noting that export revenues for each exporting firm are a fraction τ 1−σ of their domestic
From the zero cutoff profit conditions for foreign exporters as well as domestic firms in combination with f = f x , we obtain r xF (φ * xF ) = r H (φ * H ), and therefore
Replacing relative revenues by relative productivities on the left hand side of this equation, and noting thatφ
and substituting back into eq. (21) The CES price index corresponding to final output in eq. (1) is given by
Using P = 1 and accounting for the productivity distribution G(φ) = 1 − φ −k , we further obtain
Hence, withφ being defined by Y /M = q(φ) we have p(φ) = 1 and eq. (5) is immediate.
The Employment Rate in Eq. (9)
Using the adding-up condition for aggregate employment in the text, we obtain
Considering l(φ) = q(φ)/φ, q(φ) = r(φ) and r(φ) = R/M , we obtain M l(φ) = R/φ.
Furthermore, it follows from eqs. (6) and (8) (9) is immediate.
The Lorenz Curve in the Closed Economy
The Lorenz curve for secondary labour income consists of two parts. The first part is given by
It measures aggregate income of a share of γ ≤ U workers without a job relative to overall labour income.
To determine the second segment of the Lorenz curve, we first derive aggregate secondary labour income of workers who are either unemployed or employed in firms with productivities up toφ ≥ φ * as a proportion of overall labour income. This gives
Substituting w(φ)l(φ) = ρr(φ), this can be rewritten to give
We can now denote by γ the proportion of workers who earn a primary labour income of less than or equal to w(φ). This gives γ = 1−(1−U ) φ /φ * ξ−θ−k . Solving forφ/φ * and substituting the resulting expression in L 2 , we arrive at the following expression for the second Lorenz curve segment
In view of (23) and (24), the Lorenz curve for secondary labour income can thus be written as
(25)
The Lorenz curve for primary labour income, L notransfer (γ), is obtained by setting s = 0 in eq.
(25) and it is thus immediate that L notransfer (γ) does not change when s increases.
Furthermore, noting that U is invariant to changes in s, it is also immediate to determine the impact of an s-increase on L transfer (γ). First, it follows from eq. (23) that an increase in the tax rate parameter s raises L 1 (γ) for any given γ ∈ (0, U ]. Second, we can calculate
Noting F (γ) < 0, it follows that if F (γ) has an extremum in interval (U, 1), the extremum must be a maximum. Hence, F (U ) = U and F (1) = 0 imply that an increase of the profit tax rate s raises L transfer (γ) for any given γ ∈ (U, 1). Together with the result for interval (0, U ], we can thus conclude that a higher s lowers income inequality in the closed economy according to the Lorenz criterion.
Supplement B: Derivation Details for the Open Economy
The Average Productivityφ t
The CES price index in the open economy is given by
Using P = 1, we further obtain
Furthermore, defining
in total analogy to the autarky case, we arrive at
Withφ t being defined by q(φ t ) = Y /M t , we obtain p(φ t ) = 1. Furthermore, we can note that (φ x /φ) ξ = (φ * x /φ * ) ξ = τ σ−1 and thus get
Noting M t = (1 + χ)M , this finally confirmsφ t =φ.
The Employment Rate in Eq. (20)
Using the adding-up condition of employment in the open economy, we obtain
which, by virtue of eq. (9) can be reformulated to eq. (20).
The Lorenz Curve in the Open Economy
The Lorenz curve for secondary labour income in the open economy consists of three segments.
The first segment is relevant for a popoulation share of γ ≤ U and is determined in total analogy to the closed economy:
To determine the second segment of the Lorenz curve, we first calculate aggregate secondary labour income of workers who are either unemployed or employed in firms with productivities up toφ ∈ (φ * , φ * x ) as a proportion of overall secondary labour income. This gives
We can now denote by γ the proportion of workers who earn a primary labour income which is less than or equal to w(φ). Ifφ ∈ (φ * , φ * x ), this gives
Solving forφ/φ * and substituting the resulting expression in L 2 , we finally obtain
with the second segment of the Lorenz curve being relevant if γ ∈ (U, γ).
To determine the third segment of the Lorenz curve, we first derive aggregate secondary labour income of workers who are either unemployed or employed in firms with productivities up toφ ≥ φ * x as a proportion of overall secondary labour income. This gives
In analogy to above, we can now denote by γ the proportion of workers who earn a primary labour income which is less than or equal to w(φ). Ifφ ≥ φ * x , this gives
Solving the forφ/φ * and substituting the resulting expression in L 3 , we finally arrive at
where the third segment of the Lorenz curve is relevant for γ ∈ [γ, 1].
Together, eqs. (26)- (28) 
The Lorenz curve for primary labour income, L notransfer (γ), is obtained by setting s = 0 in eqs. (26)- (28) and it is thus immediate that L notransfer (γ) does not change when s increases.
Furthermore, using the same techniques as in the autarky scenario, we can also show that a higher s lowers secondary labour income inequality in the open economy.
Supplement C: Lorenz Curve Effects of a Movement from Autarky to Trade
To determine the Lorenz curve effects of a movement from autarky to trade, we can first note from our analysis in sections 2.1 and 3.2 that U > U a (with a indicating an autarky variable) if χ < 1, while U = U a if χ = 1. Hence, it is immediate from eqs. (23) and (26) that
holds for any γ ≤ U a . Furthermore, with χ < 1 it follows from a comparison of eqs. (24) and (26) 
In a next step, we can look at interval (U, γ),
In this case the second segment of the Lorenz curve is relevant in the closed as well as the open economy. One remark is in order here. If all firms export (χ = 1), then γ = U and interval (U, γ) becomes infinitesimally small. Hence, we can focus on the case with partitioning of firms by their export status (χ < 1) in the subsequent analysis.
By virtue of eqs. (24) and (27) Hence, function D(γ) must have at least one extremum on interval γ ∈ (u, γ). This extremum is characterized by the following condition:
Substituting this first order condition into the second derivative
Hence, there exists a unique interior extremum in the relevant interval, which is a maximum.
Together with D(U ) > 0 and D(γ) > 0, we can thus conclude that with χ ∈ (0, 1), D(γ) > 0 and thus L a transfer (γ) > L transfer (γ) holds for any γ ∈ (U, γ).
In a final step, we can now turn to interval [γ, 1] . In this case, the third segment of the 
Due to dG a /ds < 0 it is immediate that the considered tax-transfer system lowers inequality.
In the open economy, the area below the Lorenz curve is given by Instead of explicitly solving for G, we can calculate G − G a . This gives
After tedious but straighforward calculations, we finally arrive at
Hence, J(χ) ≥ 0 is sufficient for G − G a ≥ 0. It is thus worth to have a closer look at J(χ). The first derivative of this function is given by
Noting that J (χ) < 0 holds for all χ ∈ (0, 1] and noting further that J(0) = 2(k − ξ)/[2(k − ξ) + θ] > 0, J(1) = 0, it is immediate that G − G a = 0 if either χ = 0 or χ = 1, while G − G a > 0 if χ ∈ (0, 1). This is in line with the respective insights from the Lorenz curve analysis. Furthermore, this result confirms the shape of the relative Gini curve, G/G a in figure   5 . Finally, the downward shift of this curve after a trade-cum-redistribution reform is immediate when noting that an s-increase shifts the Lorenz curve in the open economy upwards and thus lowers G/G a unambiguously for any given χ. This completes the analysis in this supplement.
